DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 028 192 24 TE 499 950

By-Scudder, Edson F.
The Neutrality Act of 1935: An Inquiry into the Uses of History. Teacher and Student Manuals.
Amherst Coll., Mass.
Spons Agency-Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. Bureau of Research.
Report No-CRP-H-168
Bureau No-BR-5-1071
Pub Date 66
Contract-OEC-5-10-158
Note-69p.
EDRS Price MF-$0.50 HC-$3.55
Descriptors-*American History, Business, Curriculum Guides, *Exports, *Federal Legislation, Financial Policy, *Foreign Policy, Government Role, History, *History Instruction, Industry, Instructional Materials, International Organizations, Political Science, Secondary Education, Social Sciences, Social Studies Units, World Affairs
Identifiers-*Neutrality Act of 1935

This unit, geared initially for college-preparatory students at the high school level, asks the student to consider ways in which the past, however incompletely or inaccurately perceived, shapes our views of the present. Evidence is presented to show how both the isolationists and internationalists justified their actions by their interpretations of such things as the Neutrality Act of 1917, World War I, and the postwar reaction. Documents relating to the Nye Committee investigation and the rise of Fascism are used to show how the policy makers of 1935 responded to foreign and domestic pressures in their search for national security and world order. (Author)

ED028192

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

THE NEUTRALITY ACT OF 1935: AN INQUIRY INTO THE USES OF HISTORY

Teacher and Student Manuals

(Public Domain Edition)

Edson F. Scudder

Committee on the Study of History
Amherst, Massachusetts

T≡ 499 950

EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL
SUBJECT TO REVISION
PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

TEACHER'S MANUAL

THE NEUTRALITY ACT OF 1935:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE USES OF HISTORY

Edson F. Scudder
McBurney School
New York, New York

This material has been produced by the
Committee on the Study of History, Amherst, Massachusetts
under contract with the U. S. Office of Education
as Cooperative Research Project #H-168

INTRODUCTION

This unit asks students to think about the uses of history.

It begins by asking them to consider five observations about history. It ends by having them read two selections which leave the entire question wide open. Thus, the unit provides no final answers.

What it may provide, instead, at the end is a feeling of uneasiness. Students will have seen that most Americans and especially those who were instrumental in effecting passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935 were sure that they were following the right course, that they were profiting from experience, and yet things turned out wrong. How then, it may be asked, can we be sure that what we are doing today is right?

We begin, as noted, by considering the statements on history. Henry Ford, as far as we know, meant just what he said and students need have no worries about hidden implications. The other observations bear closer analysis, however. Raleigh seems to say a variety of things; perhaps that history repeats itself, perhaps that we can take comfort in our miseries because misery may be the lot of man, perhaps that there are eternal verities in history which, if recognized, can be turned to our advantage. Hegel says that peoples and nations claim to learn from history but that they never have. Santayana can be saying that if you do remember the past you can profit from it. Becker means that the study of history gives you a sense of being at ease with yourself and a sense that you can cope with situations because you see things in perspective and with understanding.

By the end of a period students should make these observations and perhaps others. At any rate, they might well be asked to check or otherwise designate for themselves the one statement which seems most sensible. Then they should be told that this unit presents a specific situation which will provide a testing ground for the validity of any and all of the statements.

SECTION I

NEUTRALITY: 1917 AND 1935

This section first impresses the student with the fact that there seems to be a vast difference between what Wilson is saying (#1) and the actual provisions of the neutrality act (#3). The student becomes aware of how vast that difference is, and finally questions how such an act could have been passed, especially by a margin of 79 to 2 (#4).

It is essential that Wilson's speech be read carefully and that emphasis be placed on the parts in which he says that neutrality "is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is concerned"

and that "we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated." The question then arises: How much of this approach to the problem of neutrality do you find in the 1935 legislation? More specifically, what has happened to the principle of freedom of the seas and to the authority which the President constitutionally has over the conduct of our foreign relations? In addition: Is the act a reasonable response to the European developments? Is it the action of a nation seeking peace? What provisions should be changed? How do you suppose foreign governments would react to the law?

Finally, what reasons do you suppose those 79 senators had for approving the bill? And why did the President sign it?

Someone might advance the proposition that if history was involved the senators must have thought that something had gone wrong when neutrality had been handled differently.

SECTION II

THE MOOD OF THE 1920'S

This section suggests the mood of the 1920's with regard to World War I in particular and towards "foreign affairs" in general, thus providing background for the question as to why the neutrality act got on the books.

The two novels (#2 and 8) and the play (#5) clearly develop the anti-war feeling of the decade, each emphasizing that feeling somewhat more than the one before. The attitude toward foreign matters comes through in the New Republic (#1) and in the speeches by Senators Johnson and Reed (#3 and 4). It should be pointed out that disillusionment set in early, that Johnson's words sound a lot like Washington and Jefferson and that, therefore, the "isolationist" feeling is of long standing, and that the sentiments expressed by Reed found expression in many domestic policies as well, a case in point being the immigration law passed in the same year.

One way to approach Barnes and Grattan (#6 and 7) is to state that historians have been divided into different "schools." The students could then be encouraged to attach some sort of a label to these two. It's too much to expect that they'll come up with "revisionist" for Barnes, but they should come close. They should then be able to indicate exactly what he's revising; namely, the idea that submarine warfare was the real cause for our entry and that our intervention was justifiable on a number of grounds. Grattan's economic bent is obvious and leads into the next section, which deals with businessmen in general and with an investigation of the munitions makers of the earlier days. It could also lead a student to observe that people could get so wrapped up in economic considerations that they might lose perspective.

SECTION III

BUSINESSMEN ON THE SPOT

The theme of the section is that the anti-businessman or maybe even anti-capitalist tone of some of the early selections, Sokolsky and FDR (#4 and 5) for example, becomes explicit as the Nye Committee looks into the activities of those who might have profited unduly during the war and post-war years. Thus, businessmen are being taken to task for contributing to the great problems which confronted the nation both in peacetime and wartime. This also offers a more immediate background for an explanation of the determination to secure laws relating to war profits and to the shipment of munitions. Much should be made of the selection which deals with "Powers Granted to the President," (#6) the better to point up contrasts later in 1935 when the President and the Congress are not working in such close harmony. There are a few nice points that should be worked for, too. FDR, for example, in his statement to the Senate (#12), did give a mild blessing to the committee, but he also put in a plug for international cooperation in an effort to supervise the arms traffic. Nye also made at least a few rather emphatic statements even before the hearings got underway (#13). In regard to the testimony (#14 and 15) and the chart (#16) the students might be asked whether or not it seems that the du Ponts and the others really fit the indictment offered earlier in the Fortune article (#7) and in Merchants of Death (#8).

SECTION IV

THE ACADEMIC APPROACH

Reading from the works of historians and others, as we do in this section, serves to remind the students that we are still concerned with history, provides a link to the earlier sections because two of the selections look into Wilson's role in 1914-1917, and enables them to move closer to an understanding of why the neutrality act was passed because the last four authors do suggest possible courses of action for the future.

How Millis (#1) and Seymour (#2) differ as to Wilson's role should be pointed out: Millis has Wilson sort of fumbling along while Seymour claims that he knew what was going on and was acting on principle. But the two real questions for the section are probably these: Should Millis be included among the "revisionists?" Do you suppose that any of these articles actually had an influence on the making of policy?

Perhaps the answer to the first is more difficult, Probably Millis doesn't belong with "revisionists," his style makes it seem that he just isn't mad enough, and yet he does come close when he mentions the possibility of a peace without victory "which would have been saner, more stable, less harrowing for all the Powers than the calamitous settlement and the profound dislocations which the Entente peoples were actually to win two years later."

As for the second question, Millis's version of the nation bungling its way into war had an influence on public opinion, a conclusion which students ought to be able to gather from the selection, while Warren's article (#3) should seem almost a memorandum for those who were going to draw up the legislation, as, in fact, it was.

SECTION V

1935: A CLOSER LOOK

A. The Legislative Process and the President

The question here is what is the President up to? At the end the question is the one Burns asks in Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox: "Why did he not, through words or action, seek to change popular attitudes and thus rechannel the pressures working on him?" What has happened to those qualities of leadership which were so prominently on display in 1933?

There are answers or partial explanations at least. As the headlines on the World Court issue (#A2) suggest, the setback for FDR in this instance may have forced him into a cautious position for too long. His concern with domestic matters comes through in his first "fireside chat" (#A12) and suggests that he might have temporarily abandoned leadership in foreign affairs so as not to jeopardize the "second New Deal."

At any rate, students should follow the President's performance and ask themselves did he try hard enough?

B. The Congressional Debates and After

The President remains at center stage. The questions now arise: what can we make of his statement to reporters (#B4) that the legislation "meets the needs of the existing situation" and of his statement as he signed the act? If he had these feelings all along, should he have fought harder in the earlier stages?

In the congressional debates (#B1-3) it should be noted, Johnson is maintaining the same position he had always had and men, on both sides, were still calling upon history to offer support for their particular positions.

SECTION VI

THE USES OF HISTORY: LAST THOUGHTS

The last two selections are intended to give the student a double jolt and to remind him that he may never be quite sure about the uses of history. Schlesinger (#1) suggests that historical analogies are difficult at best and notes that history "teaches us. . . that the future is full of surprises." Then comes a surprise in the form of the article by Senator McCarthy (#2) who seems to be Nye all over again.

So what's the verdict?

The students should probably be asked to re-examine the statements presented in the introduction and decide whether they still agree with their previous choice.

Perhaps they'll think that Becker is best.

Perhaps someone will say that trying to figure out the uses of the past is hard enough but when it looks as though the past has been mis-read the task is impossible.

EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL
SUBJECT TO REVISON
PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

STUDENT'S MANUAL

THE NEUTRALITY ACT OF 1935:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE USES OF HISTORY

Edson F. Scudder
McBurney School
New York, New York

This material has been produced
by the
Committee on the Study of History, Amherst, Massachusetts
under contract with the U. S. Office of Education
as Cooperative Research Project #H-168

NOTE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

This unit was prepared by the Committee on the Study of History, Amherst College, under contract with the United States Office of Education. It is one of a number of units prepared by the Amherst Project, and was designed to be used either in series with other units from the Project or independently, in conjunction with other materials. While the units were geared initially for college-preparatory students at the high school level, experiments with them by the Amherst Project suggest the adaptability of many of them, either wholly or in part, for a considerable range of age and ability levels, as well as in a number of different kinds of courses.

The units have been used experimentally in selected schools throughout the country, in a wide range of teaching/learning situations. The results of those experiments will be incorporated in the Final Report of the Project on Cooperative Research grant H-168, which will be distributed through ERIC.

Except in one respect, the unit reproduced here is the same as the experimental unit prepared and tried out by the Project. The single exception is the removal of excerpted articles which originally appeared elsewhere and are under copyright. While the Project received special permission from authors and publishers to use these materials in its experimental edition, the original copyright remains in force, and the Project cannot put such materials in the public domain. They have been replaced in the present edition by bracketed summaries, and full bibliographical references have been included in order that the reader may find the material in the original.

This unit was initially prepared in the summer of 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..... 1

I - NEUTRALITY: 1917 AND 1935..... 3

II - THE MOOD OF THE 1920'S..... 9

III - BUSINESSMEN ON THE SPOT..... 15

IV - THE ACADEMIC APPROACH..... 29

V - 1935: A CLOSER LOOK..... 32

A. The Legislative Process and the President..... 32
B. The Congressional Debates and After..... 45

VI - THE USES OF HISTORY: LAST THOUGHTS..... 57

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING..... 58

INTRODUCTION

Decisions! Decisions!

We hear that wail often these days from persons bemoaning the fact that they have innumerable things to do and just don't know where to get started.

We hear a lot, too about decision-making--which has a more serious ring. We think immediately of the White House, of briefings, of advisers being flown into Washington, of congressional hearings, of television programs being interrupted by bulletins announcing that the President will deliver a special message tonight at 10 P.M. to the American people.

Is history or a knowledge of the nation's past an aid or a guide in making these hard decisions? What, after all, are the uses of history? The following statements suggest some answers.

> We may gather out of history a policy no less wise than eternal, by the comparison and application of other men's forepassed miseries with our own like errors and ill deservings.
>
> (Walter Raleigh)[1]

> Rulers, statesmen, nations are wont to be emphatically commended to the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experience and history teach is this--that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history.
>
> (G. W. F. Hegel)[2]

> Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it.
>
> (George Santayna)[3]

---

[1]H. L. Mencken, ed., A New Dictionary of Quotations on Historical Principles from Ancient and Modern Sources (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1942), 536.

[2]Burton Stevenson, ed., The Macmillan Book of Proverbs, Maxims, and Famous Phrases (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948), 1144.

[3]Quoted just before the Foreword in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1960).

History is bunk.

(Henry Ford)[4]

[History is valuable for its effect on the moral life of the individual.]

(Carl Becker)[5]

---

[4]Burton Stevenson, ed., Proverbs, Maxims, and Famous Phrases, 1143.

[5]Carl Becker, "A New Philosophy of History," Dial, LIX (September 2, 1915), 148.

SECTION I

NEUTRALITY: 1917 AND 1935

The way in which the United States became involved in World War I was very much in the minds of the men who drafted, debated, and voted upon the Neutrality Act of 1935.

1. On April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson asked the Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. These were his reasons:[1]

> Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.
>
> I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the

---

[1] Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 102-104.

lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. . . .

There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. . . .

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. . . . Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. . . . The world must be made safe for democracy.

2. Front page headlines in The New York Times marked the trend of events in Europe in the opening months of 1935:[2]

---

[2]All headlines appeared on the front page of The New York Times on the date indicated.

[The headlines indicate the build up of Italian armies and the Italian intention of conquering Ethiopia. The resulting British, French and German military build-ups and their pondering of policy decisions with reference to the Ethiopian situation are also mentioned.]

3. Late in August, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1935:[3]

Resolved. . . That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such belligerent states, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country.

The President, by proclamation, shall definitely enumerate the arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the export of which is prohibited by this Act.

The President may, from time to time, by proclamation, extend such embargo. . . to other states as and when they may become involved in such war. . . .

[T]his section and all proclamations issued thereunder shall not be effective after February 29, 1936.

Sec. 2. . . . Within ninety days after the effective date of this Act, or upon first engaging in business, every person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war referred to in this Act, whether as an exporter, importer manufacturer, or dealer, shall register with the Secretary of State his name, or business name, principal place of business, and places of business in the United States, and a list of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war which he manufactures, imports, or exports. . . .

Every person required to register under the provisions of this section shall pay a registration fee of $500, and upon receipt of such fee the Secretary of State shall issue a registration certificate valid for five years, which shall be renewable for further periods of five years upon the payment of each renewal of a fee of $500.

---

[3] U. S. Statutes at Large (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1936), XLIX, Part 1, 1081-1084.

It shall be unlawful for any person to export, or attempt to export, from the United States any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war referred to in this Act to any other country or to import, or attempt to import, to the United States from any other country any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war referred to in this Act without first having obtained a license therefor. . . .

Sec. 3. Whenever the President shall issue the proclamation provided for in section 1 of this Act, thereafter it shall be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any port of the belligerent countries named in such proclamation as being at war, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country. . . .

Sec. 5. Whenever, during any war in which the United States in neutral, the President shall find that special restrictions placed on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United States, or of its possessions, by the submarines of a foreign nation will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign nations, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any such submarine to enter a port or the territorial waters of the United States or any of its possessions, or to depart therefrom, except under such conditions and subject to such limitations as the President may prescribe. . . .

Sec. 6. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is a neutral, the President shall find that the maintenance of peace between the United States and foreign nations, or the protection of the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or the security of the United States requires that the American citizens should refrain from traveling as passengers on the vessels of any belligerent nation, he shall so proclaim, and thereafter no citizen of the United States shall travel on any vessel of any belligerent nation except at his own risk, unless in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe. . . .

Sec. 7. In every case of the violation of any of the provisions of this Act where a specific penalty is not herein provided, such violator, or violators, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

4. The measure passed the House without a roll-call vote. In the Senate the vote was[4]

YEAS--79

Adams	Copeland	Logan	Reynolds
Ashurst	Costigan	Lonergan	Robinson
Austin	Davis	Long	Russell
Bachman	Dieterich	McAdoo	Schwellenbach
Batley	Donahey	McCarran	Sheppard
Barbour	Fletcher	McGill	Shipstead
Barkley	Frazier	McKellar	Smith
Black	George	Maloney	Steiwer
Bone	Gibson	Metcalf	Thomas, Okla.
Borah	Glass	Minton	Thomas, Utah
Brown	Gore	Moore	Townsend
Bulkley	Guffey	Murphy	Trammell
Bulow	Hale	Murray	Truman
Burke	Harrison	Neely	Tydings
Byrnes	Hatch	Norbeck	Vandenberg
Capper	Hayden	Norris	Wagner
Caraway	Holt	Nye	Walsh
Chavez	Johnson	O'Mahoney	Wheeler
Clark	LaFollette	Pittman	White
Connally	Lewis	Radcliffe	

NAYS--2

Bankhead	Gerry

NOT VOTING--15

Bilbo	Couzens	Keyes	Pope
Byrd	Dickinson	King	Schall
Carey	Duffy	McNary	Van Nuys
Coolidge	Hastings	Overton	

---

[4] Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 14434.

SECTION II

THE MOOD OF THE 1920'S

In the years between 1917 and 1935, the United States encouraged and acted upon the limitation of naval tonnages, considered the idea of joining the Permanent Court of International Justice, and joined with all the leading nations in the world in renouncing war in their dealings with one another by signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At home, it was perhaps another golden age in American writing but it was also the era of bath-tub gin, Al Capone, the long-to-be-remembered quotations. Calvin Coolidge could say: "The business of America is business," and Mrs. Belmont could apparently advise a wavering suffragette: "Call on God, my dear. She will help you." Historians have pinned a variety of labels on these proceedings: "The Roaring 20's"; "The Golden 20's"; "The Jazz Age." In the following selections you will discover one of the prevailing moods of the decade.

1. Even before the debate on ratification of the Treaty of Versailles got underway in the Senate, the following comment appeared on the cover of one of the country's leading periodicals:[1]

> [The statement argues against joining European alliances which might limit U.S. freedom of actions, expecially dangerous in unstable times.]

---

[1] New Republic, XIX (May 24, 1919).

2. One of the first of the war novels was written by John Dos Passos who had been an ambulance driver behind the lines in France:[2]

> [The selection consists of the conversation of two soldiers who talk casually of the horrors they have witnessed. It ends with a description of the frustration felt by one of them.]

3. Among the treaties negotiated at Washington in 1921-1922 was the Four-Power Treaty according to which England, the United States, France and Japan agreed "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean" and to "communicate. . . fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken" should any outside power threaten those rights.[3]

Senator Hiram Johnson of California advanced these arguments in the Senate debate on the treaty:[4]

> From the beginning of the contest concerning the League of Nations some of us have endeavored to make plain that our position was not one of aloofness or isolation for the United States. We neither expect nor wish to live a hermit nation. We ask only to live our own life in our own way, in friendship and sympathy with all, in alliance with none. Repeatedly I have stated, and I reiterate it now, that I believe in consultations and conferences among the nations of the earth, consultations and conferences open and free, so peoples as well as rulers may be informed. A righteous public opinion is the best rule of mankind. We would welcome an international forum meeting at stated intervals and as occasion required, where international questions could be discussed in the open, where all the world could see and understand.

---

[2]John Dos Passos, Three Soldiers (George H. Doran Company, New York, 1921), 112-113.

[3]Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922 (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1938), I, 35.

[4]Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3775-3776, 3778.

At once, in international disputes, the most potent factor would be the public opinion of the world. Let this public opinion operate under such circumstances and there would be no future wars. No leagues are required for this, no allegiances, no engagements to devise efficient means to meet aggression, no freezing of the status quo by ambiguous treaties, so that wronged peoples will be forever without redress. Openness, frankness, the sunlight of publicity alone are required. In such an international forum, with its members bound to nothing but frankness and publicity, no statesman would run counter to his people, and no people would wish for war. This constitutes real conference, real consultation, and means the era of peace. . . .

Now, let us follow the provisions of article 2. If there is an aggressive action by another power, the parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly, just as in article 7 of the Chinese treaty, which provides for consultation alone. In the new alliance, however, after the communication among the parties, there is yet something to be done. The communication is for a definite purpose, and that purpose is "to arrive at an understanding."

Now assume an aggression from an outside power. Communications pass among the parties. The communications are not mere felicitations, but for the purpose of arriving at an understanding. What understanding? Why, "The most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." Now, around the council table sit Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States. There is an aggressive action against the insular possessions of one of the parties. There is open, full, and frank communication. The parties reach an understanding, and if the aggression be an armed aggression, of course, there can be but one conclusion, to meet it and defeat it. The parties thus sitting about the council table agree that the aggression must be met with armed force. Our friends on the other side say, after thus agreeing, any one of the parties may "quit" or "scuttle and run"--oh, don't you remember the terms of the recent debate upon a cognate question? They pretend that there is no legal or moral obligation for subsequent action. There may be no legal obligation. The obligation may be vague, indefinite, inchoate, but when nations agree to respect one another's rights, when they go further and covenant that if those rights are attacked they will determine the most efficient measures to meet the attack, surely there is some obligation, call it what you will, upon the parties to the contract to execute the means agreed upon.

4. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the establishment at the Hague of an independent Permanent Court of International Justice. From the beginning one of the judges on this "World Court" was an American, but throughout the 1920's and into the 1930's the American Senate continued to debate the wisdom of our joining. Senator Reed of Missouri made these comments in the 1924 discussions:[5]

> Who compose this World Court? I am giving the personnel as I last heard it. It may have been changed at any time by the tribunal which created it, and of which we are not a member. Unless there has been some recent change, the President is Bernard Loder, of Holland. Who among these petitioners knows anything as to Bernard Loder's views touching the international rights of the United States? Which one of these petitioners and which one of these distinguished Senators can tell us anything whatsoever with reference to the character of thought which dominates Bernard Loder? They may answer to-morrow, but if they answer to-morrow they will in the interim have been obliged to look up Bernard Loder in Who's Who in Europe. We know in a vague way that he is a man of some prominence in his own country, but I ask which one of you would be willing to submit a matter involving a private controversy of your clients to Bernard Loder without first finding out something more about him than you know at the present time? But with a generosity that is childlike these gentlemen come forward and propose that we shall submit what may mean the life or death of this Republic to a tribunal presided over by a man about whom they know substantially nothing. . . .
>
> Members: Viscount Robert Bannatyne Finlay, of Great Britain: Dionisio Anzilotti, of Italy; Rafael Altamira, of Spain. Now, just what does Rafael stand for? Which one of you is willing to submit your own controversy to this gentleman with the aristocratic name?. . .
>
> Then, there is Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente, of Cuba. Now, of course, we know from that very name that anybody is safe in submitting any kind of a controversy, individual or international, to Bustamente. He represents a great country

---

[5] Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 5075.

to our South that produces two things we need very much in this country according to the appetites but not according to the professions or votes of the statesmen of Washington. One is sugar, and the other is the thing that makes sugar palatable in a toddy; but his country stands to-day on its feet, because it is propped in its position by the United States. Here sits a man representing this little island to our South, and it is proposed that he shall sit upon a tribunal and decide the controversies between the United States and the great powers of the earth. . . .

Mr. President, some great genius might undertake to portray the farce of world politics; but if he were to succeed it would be only necessary for him to present a picture of these 11 men filing into a room and proposing to settle a controversy between the United States and Great Britain where there was really bad blood aroused. . . .

I assert, and I shall prove, that the only thing about this Court of International Justice that bears the slightest resemblance to a court of justice, as we understand it, is to be found in the name "court," which it has adopted. You can not change facts by changing names. It was Abraham Lincoln who once said, "If I say that a dog's tail is a leg, how many legs will the dog have?" Instantly somebody said "Five." Lincoln said, "Oh, no; he will have four. Calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg." Calling a thing a court does not make it a court.

5. The play What Price Glory opened in New York in 1924. A note in the program indicated that it was "a play of war as it is, not as it has been presented theatrically for thousands of years" and asked the audience "to bear with certain expletives which. . . are employed because the mood and truth of the play demand their employment." In a moving scene:[6]

> [Upon finding his friend shot, a lieutenant rages against the senseless cruelty of war.]

6. In the early 20's, most of the historical writings concerning World War I involved the editing of papers of persons who had played diplomatic

---

[6]Maxwell Anderson and Laurence Stallings, Three American Plays (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1926), 59-60.

roles in the years from 1914 to 1917. In general, these accounts at least implied that our intervention had been desirable not only on moral grounds but also because we had a real stake in making sure that Germany did not emerge from the struggle as the dominant power in Europe. In 1926, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College wrote the first full-length account of the war. In his conclusions he explained:[7]

> [The passage argues that Wilson had promised aid to Britain well before the issue of German submarine activity had come up. Barnes states that Wilson's pacifist stand in the campaign of 1916 was strategy first to win the election, and then to appear more convincing when Wilson did announce his decision to intervene. Barnes concludes that the U.S. involvement was instrumental in prolonging the war and ultimately disastrous to our own interests, financial and moral.]

7. One of Barnes's students expanded upon the theme three years later:[8]

> [The selection contends that the U.S. entered the war principally from economic motives. Our allegiances were no doubt strengthened by our economic success. The shipments of arms to allies served mainly to confirm the bitterness of the German public to the U.S.]

8. Erich Remarque was a German soldier during World War I. His novel, All Quiet on the Western Front, was translated in 1929, became a Book-of-the-Month Club selection for June, and from the end of June to the end of the year was almost always on the list of fictional

---

[7]Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1926), 642-646.

[8]C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought (The Vanguard Press, New York, 1929), 127, 135, 140-141.

"best sellers." As of June, 1930, about 240,000 copies had been sold in the United States.

In the novel, the German front line positions had been under constant bombardment for days:[9]

> [The passage describes the emotions and thoughts of men in combat.]

---

[9]Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (G. P. Putnam's Sons, London, 1929), 125-127.

SECTION III

BUSINESSMEN ON THE SPOT

In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria, beginning the chain of events which we now clearly see led directly to the outbreak of World War II and, in time, to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Although the United States announced that we would recognize no changes brought about by force and the League of Nations sent a commission to look into the circumstances which had prompted the Japanese actions, nothing more was done, and the Japanese responded by announcing their intent to leave the League. Collective security had failed, and the lessons were not lost on the European dictators. Adolph Hitler, coming to power in Germany just as Franklin Roosevelt was being inaugurated for the first time, was soon committed to scrapping the provisions of the hated Versailles "Diktat." And world domination was perhaps in his sights.

At the same time, all the economic indices indicated what was already abundantly clear: that many Americans, in the midst of the "Great Depression," were living in ways and circumstances quite different from anything they had experienced in the past. Many began to examine more closely and to question more seriously the policies and leadership which they believed had brought them to their present state.

1. The "economics" of the situation may be briefly summarized:[1]

> [The section describes the state of production, unemployment, gross national product, construction and investment in March, 1933.]

---

[1]Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, 1963), 290.

2. Here are some aspects of what one historian has called "The Descent in Human Terms":[2]

[The selection describes the lamentable state of nutrition and family structure in the early 30's.]

3. Another view of the situation:[3]

[The cartoon consists of a stylized graph with index dropping. At the bottom is an emaciated figure leaning against the line as if for support against a fence.]

4. A columnist reported on his travels throughout the nation:[4]

[The selection describes the economic deterioration of the nation, especially in the East. Confidence in the system is shaken, although very rarely to the point of hope for revolution.]

5. Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered his First Inaugural Address:[5]

[The statement claims that the depression resulted from a failure in monetary regulation, especially in credit, and not from a paucity of resources.]

6. In the "first 100 Days," the Congress acted on the President's words:[6]

POWERS GRANTED TO THE PRESIDENT

[The list includes the areas of wages, business licences, public works programs, relief, the Federal Reserve System, veteran's programs, government salaries, government organization, taxes, currency, employment, railroads and the Tennessee Valley Authority.]

---

[2]David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941 (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1965), 112-115.

[3]The New Yorker. January 16, 1932, 13.

[4]George Sokolsky, "The Temper of the People," New Outlook, 161 (April, 1933), 13, 15.

[5]The New York Times, March 5, 1935, 1.

[6]Ibid., June 17, 1933, 1.

7. About the same time the editors of Fortune published an article which they characterized as "no more than an opening gun" in what they anticipated would be "a greater campaign." The opening paragraphs indicate the tone and suggest the scope of the article:[7]

> [The article criticizes makers of arms, and related businesses, for promoting war for purposes of profit.]

8. Essentially the same theme was developed in a book which became the Book-of-the-Month Club selection for April, 1934:[8]

> [The selection documents the amoral dealings of arms merchants, but places the final blame for their behavior on the political system which encourages an emphasis on armament.]

9. The American Senate showed its concern by creating the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee with Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota as its chairman. The committee was directed:[9]

> (a) To investigate the activities of individuals and of corporations in the United States engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, import, or export of arms, munitions, or other implements of war; the nature of the industrial and commercial organizations engaged in the manufacture of or traffic in arms, munitions, or other implements of war; the methods used in promoting or effecting the sale of arms, munitions, or other implements of war; the quantities of arms, munitions or other implements of war imported into the United States and the countries of origin thereof, and the quantities exported from the United States and the countries of destination thereof; and

---

[7]"Arms and the Men," Fortune, IX (March, 1934), 53.

[8]H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry (Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1934), 3-4, 6-9.

[9]Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 6476-6477.

(b) To investigate and report upon the adequacy or inadequacy of existing legislation, and of the treaties to which the United States is a party, for the regulation and control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms, munitions, and other implements of war within the United States, and of the traffic therein between the United States and other countries; and

(c) To review the findings of the War Policies Commission and to recommend such specific legislation as may be deemed desirable to accomplish the purposes set forth in such findings and in the preamble to this resolution; and

(d) To inquire into the desirability of creating a Government monopoly in respect to the manufacture of armaments and munitions and other implements of war, and to submit recommendations thereon.

For the purposes of this resolution the committee is authorized to hold hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions and recesses of the Congress until the final report is submitted, to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, and to make such expenditures, as it deems advisable.

10. No one expected the committee's task whould be easy:[10]

[The cartoon shows a chick, the Senate Munitions Investigation, tugging at the tail of a worm, arms traffic, whose immense bulk begins to emerge here and there across the landscape, the chick and his mother hen, the U.S. State Department, are clearly dismayed. The worm is indignant.]

11. Comments and observations were made in many of the country's leading magazines:[11]

[The first comment describes arms makers as part of a "network of incorporated murder" and "the most dangerous octopus of modern times."

---

[10]John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36 (Louisiana State Univ. Press, Baton Rouge, 1963), 75.

[11]"Murder, Incorporated," New Republic, April 25, 1934, 298; John Gunther, "Slaughter for Sale," Harper's, May, 1934, 649, 653; Johannes Steel, "The World's Greatest Racket," Nation, June 6, 1934, 646.

The second item is the expressed hope that if the author should be shot in war, that it not be by a bullet made in his own country. If he should be killed, he wishes the profit on the bullet be acknowledged.

The third comment describes the making of arms as a "racket" in which competition is welcomed, and even publicized. in the press owned by the manufacturers of arms.]

12. FDR himself sent a special letter to the Senate of the United States:[12]

I have been gratified to learn that, pursuant to a resolution of the Senate, a committee has been appointed to investigate the problems incident to the private manufacture of arms and munitions of war and the international traffic therein. I earnestly recommend that this committee receive the generous support of the Senate, in order that it may be enabled to pursue the investigation with which it is charged with a degree of thoroughness commensurate with the high importance of the questions at issue. The executive departments of the Government will be charged to cooperate with the committee to the fullest extent in furnishing it with any information in their possession which it may desire to receive, and their views upon the adequacy or inadequacy of existing legislation and of the treaties to which the United States is a party for the regulation and control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms.

The private and uncontrolled manufacture of arms and munitions and the traffic therein has become a serious source of international discord and strife. It is not possible, however, effectively to control such an evil by the isolated action of any one country. The enlightened opinion of the world has long realized that this is a field in which international action is necessary. The negotiation of the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925, was an important step in the right direction. That convention is still before the Senate. I hope that the Senate may find it possible to give its advice and consent to its ratification. The ratification of that convention by this Government, which has been too long delayed, would be a concrete indication of the willingness of the American people to make their contribution toward the suppression of abuses which may have disastrous results for the entire world if they are permitted to continue unchecked.

---

[12] Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 9095.

> It is my earnest hope that the representatives of the nations who will reassemble at Geneva on May 29 will be able to agree upon a convention containing provisions for the supervision and control of the traffic in arms much more far-reaching than those which were embodied in the convention of 1925. Some suitable international organization must and will take such action. The peoples of many countries are being taxed to the point of poverty and starvation in order to enable governments to engage in a mad race in armaments which, if permitted to continue, may well result in war. This grave menace to the peace of the world is due in no small measure to the uncontrolled activities of the manufacturers and merchants of engines of destruction, and it must be met by the concerted action of the peoples of all nations.
>
> Franklin D. Roosevelt
>
> The White House, May 18, 1934

13. And Nye, in speeches in various parts of the country, made some emphatic statements.

At a World Peaceways luncheon in New York:[13]

> The time is coming when there will be a realization of what monkeys the munitions makers can make of the otherwise intelligent people of America.

To an audience at the World's Fair in Chicago:[14]

> During the four years of peacetime the du Ponts made only $4,000,000. During the four years of war they made $24,000,000 in profits. Naturally, du Pont sees red when he sees these profits attacked by international peace.

14. Committee hearings began in September, 1934. By the time the committee submitted its preliminary report to the Senate the following April, they had examined 116 witnesses, taken 3,502 pages of testimony and exhibits and spent 62 days discussing that testimony.[15] Much of

---

[13] The New York Times, May 1, 1934, 16.

[14] Ibid., August 28, 1934, 15.

[15] Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4726.

the testimony in December was concerned with the activities of the du Ponts:[16]

> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. It is true the first hundred-odd years of the company's experience were entirely in the powder business. Since about 1905 the company has branched out into other industries.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN. Since when?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. I think it was about 1905 when we first started branching out.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN. Did you do any such branching out at any time as you did after the war, immediately after the war?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. The intent to branch out, I think, took place before the beginning of the war, and certainly before the entry of the United States into the war.
>
> SENATOR CLARK [Missouri]. But, Mr. du Pont, a great deal of the branching out that was done was from funds accumulated from war profits?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. No, sir; that is not a fair statement.
>
> SENATOR CLARK. Why is it not a fair statement?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. Because, as explained in the previous hearings, there were not enough profits from the World War to in any substantial degree pay for the branching out that has occurred.
>
> SENATOR CLARK. I do not have before me right now the figures, but what were your figures of profit during the World War?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. At the end of the war, the World War, it was shown that there was something like $60,000,000 of accumulated profits in the company's treasury.
>
> SENATOR CLARK. And you invested some $60,000,000 in the control or in the practical control of General Motors, did you not?
>
> MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. Some $50,000,000.

---

[16]U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, Hearings on the Munitions Industry, Part 12, 2708-2710.

SENATOR CLARK. Some 50 million?

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. But you must recall, Senator, that that was only part--

SENATOR CLARK. So it would seem that some of that branching out for the control, at least, of the General Motors Co., in general, was from war profits.

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. But the extent of the company has gone to $250,000,000 or $300,000.000.

SENATOR CLARK. But you have had the opportunity of branching out since.

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. So I say that the $60,000,000 is no very considerable part of two hundred and fifty or three hundred million.

THE CHAIRMAN. How near could you have come to the 250 million if you had not first had the 60 million?

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. That is a question I cannot answer, because that $250,000,000 was raised in an entirely different manner.

SENATOR CLARK. Mr. du Pont, I was not present when you went into the first part of your testimony before, and therefore I did not ask you to put it in the record; but can you tell offhand or will you prepare a statement showing how much, if any, money was owing to the du Pont Co. from the allied and associated nations or their fiscal and purchasing agents in this country, such as Morgan, at the time the United States entered the war?

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. That was owing to the du Pont Co.?

SENATOR CLARK. Yes.

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. I think there was none sir.

SENATOR CLARK. Will you investigate that and give us that information?

MR. LAMMOT DU PONT. I am not sure we can do that right now. If so, I will be glad to.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. I can answer that right off. The foreign governments have always paid in advance, cash, on every purchase. We owed them right through the war. At one time it got up to 107 millions; it was 102 millions at the end of the month, but in the middle of the month it was 197 millions.

SENATOR CLARK. That was advance payments, where you had not delivered the ammunition?

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Yes; and this money made out of the war that you speak of, that was foreign trade.

SENATOR CLARK. Yes.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. There was nobody here in this country that was taxed to get that. That was all profits brought to this country from foreign trade. I do not see why you should belittle that. I think that shows that our customers were extremely well satisfied. I think you will find that the French Government decorated Pierre, showing their appreciation, and I think we have some letters showing further --

THE CHAIRMAN. They also decorated Sir Basil Zaharoff.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. I don't know about that. You are getting in good company now. But the facts are that I cannot see anything particularly wicked about having served those people over there who later became our allies. They were very glad to get the help, and we made money in doing it, and we served them well. I take exception to your idea that this is just a bloody proposition of selling somebody else's life for money. It is outrageous.

SENATOR CLARK. Of course, Mr. du Pont, you approach the matter of war from an entirely different viewpoint from that held by a good many others.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Yes; perhaps. You were not in the game, or you might have a different viewpoint too.

SENATOR CLARK. I was in the game, though, when it came to putting on a uniform.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. That is quite true.

SENATOR CLARK. In other words, you approach the subject of war from a viewpoint that regards the war as a situation out of which there may be made two or three hundred million dollars of profits and come out with a whole hide. On the other hand, I entered the war, with three boys, without any prospect of making any money out of it, but who might be considered in the position of becoming cannon fodder. Therefore, we look at it from a diametrically opposite viewpoint.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Senator, you do not abhor war any more than I do. I do not care what kind of a speech you make to the people here; I don't believe you abhor it any more than I do. Now, we did provide ammunition to foreign governments. They asked for it. I think we did a swell job. We have now gone into a number of other things which have helped this country a great deal.

SENATOR CLARK. Mr. du Pont, we intend no criticism of your peacetime activities unconnected with the manufacture of munitions. This inquiry has to do soley with the manufacture of munitions.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Yes; and I am rather proud of the part we played in it.

SENATOR CLARK. You have heard no criticism on the part of the du Pont company. That is entirely outside the scope of this investigation.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. That is satisfactory.

SENATOR CLARK. But as far as coming back to the question of the financial relations with the Allies, I think it is of very great importance, because a great many people in this country, including myself, as I said the other day, believed that the insistence of the United States in shipping munitions to one series of combatants ultimately led us into the war--we could not ship to the others--ultimately led us into the war, and, therefore, to the extent of some 20 billion dollars, did impose a tax on the American people, and therefore it is material, to say the least, to go into that question.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Mr. Senator, I can conceive of a roundabout route by which the sending of munitions from this country helped get that country into the war. It is this: If we had not sent those munitions over, the foreign countries would have been licked, and we would never have had a chance to get into the war. They would have come here.

SENATOR CLARK. That is purely a matter of conjecture on your part. There is no evidence whatever to show me we would have ever entered in the war or ever fired a gun except for that course of action.

15. The committee was especially concerned with the relationship between industrialists and the government during World War I and with the matter of war profits.[17]

> MR. HISS [Committee Counsel]. Mr. du Pont, to return to the specific question, Is it not true that during the period from the beginning of the World War until the end of the World War your company built some $60,000,000 worth of powder plants not in existence at the beginning; that is, you extended your capacity by approximately--
>
> MR. PIERRE DU PONT. I think the total is $80,000,000 in the record.
>
> MR. HISS. $80,000,000. During the same period, or toward the end of that period, your company, in additions, went into the dye field, with an investment of some additional millions, and also developed one or two other industries. You went into paints and other things, too?
>
> MR. PIERRE DU PONT. Yes, sir.
>
> MR. HISS. During that time, 1914 to 1920, do you know of any financing, public financing, carried on by the du Pont Cos. to aid their construction of these plants?
>
> MR. PIERRE DU PONT. There was no public financing or offering of securities. That is correct, is it not?
>
> MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. Yes, sir. . . . Of course, the very large financing of that construction was furnished by the advances of the Allies, which you read, and which was apparently confused with the advances from the United States Government, which it was not.
>
> That long list of advances, running up to $97,000,000, was advanced--money advanced to us by the Allies--used for the purpose of expansion.
>
> MR. HISS. I attempted to make that clear and I am sorry if I did not, and I asked for a statement as to how much had been advanced by the United States Government, which your company will furnish.

---

[17] Ibid., Part 13, 2916-2917, 2919.

SENATOR VANDENBERG [Michigan]. We loaned them the money which they advanced to you, did we not?

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. No, sir. That was advanced before the United States got in the habit of loaning.

MR. HISS. Furthermore, a large investment was made in General Motors Co. during this period, too. Is not that correct?

MR. PIERRE DU PONT. May I look at this?

MR. HISS. Certainly [handing paper to witness].

MR. PIERRE DU PONT. I am not certain of this one item.

MR. IRÉNÉE DU PONT. What is the origin of this statement? Was that taken from our files?

MR. HISS. No; your company prepared it at my request.

MR. ELIASON. We furnished that statement.

MR. PIERRE DU PONT. It is certainly correct, then.

MR. HISS. Colonel Harris, is it not true that during the war, as a result of the enormous expenditures by the Government which have already been referred to and to the advancing of funds by the Government, a considerable amount of the risk of doing contracting business for the Government was assumed by the Government?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS. In many cases that is true, and in many cases it is not true.

MR. HISS. Will you describe for the committee the use of cost-plus contracts during the World War?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS. In the case of those non-commercial items with which industry was not familiar and could not form a reasonable estimate of cost, it was found necessary in many cases, and also in the case of cantonments, where speed was so urgent that time for negotiation could not be spared, it was found necessary to enter into what is known as a "cost-plus contract"; that is, the Government defraying all costs and paying the contractor--reimbursing the contractor for all costs, plus a percentage fee in the total expenditures.

In many cases, however, there was a top limit to the amount that the contractor could earn through this percentage of profit.

SENATOR VANDENBERG. What was that percentage fee ordinarily?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS. Ten percent, generally speaking, in the beginning, although in later contracts there were variations from that.

SENATOR CLARK. Variations up?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS. Generally down, Senator.

MR. HISS. What is the present attitude of the War Department, in retrospect, with all the value of hindsight, on cost-plus contracts?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS. We, together with everybody else, are opposed to cost-plus contracts. We still, however, do not know quite how we are going to make contracts in time of war for material unknown to the contractor, with which he is not familiar. We do not know just how we are going to make a contract to cover that contingency right now.

16. Exhibit No. 1111 related to the question of war profits:[18]

Year	Net taxable income	Invested capital	Percent of net income to invested capital
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION			
1916 ----------	$ 5,504,547.56	$ 41,726,787.83	13.19
1917 ----------	61,810,017.06	140,792,430.42	43.902
1918 ----------	16,432,934.71	196,294,174.07	8.371
1919 ----------	12,781,779.32	199,066,918.02	6.220
1920 ----------	12,231,527.04	202,700,997.83	6.034
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CO.			
1916 ----------	$20,254,737.65	$ 95,356,723.61	21.241
1917 ----------	48,869,577.22	103,057,128.74	47.420
1918 ----------	29,654,130.20	139,540,274.53	21.251
1919 ----------	16,970,731.57	151,008,060.66	11.238
1920 ----------	32,288,372.27	153,486,461.35	47.536

* * * * *

COLT'S PATENT FIRE ARMS CO.			
1916 ----------	$ 5,799,586.38	$ 9,628,756.46	60.231
1917 ----------	5,797,793.87	8,932,106.15	64.910
1918 ----------	5,693,152.17	11,113,685.68	51.227
1919 ----------	980,844.08	13,308,669.69	7.370
1920 ----------	843,599.98	10,516,615.22	8.022

* * * * *

SAVAGE ARMS CORPORATION			
1916 ----------	$ 2,964,107.38	$ 14,929,583.08	19.86
1917 ----------	6,517,561.64	10,017,299.16	65.08
1918 ----------	6,917,381.73	15,810,910.17	43.75
1919 ----------	1,637,129.16	18,400,892.97	08.9
1920 ----------	(1,421,436.23)	16,062,034.07	-----

[18] Ibid., 2985-2986.

SECTION IV

THE ACADEMIC APPROACH

Historians and others wrote a number of books and articles in 1934 and 1935 in which they re-evaluated the leadership of 1914-1917 and also proposed courses of action for the nation should it seem as though history was repeating itself.

1. Walter Millis was an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune who had already written The Martial Spirit, a popular account of the Spanish-American War. in 1935, he wrote Road to War: America, 1914-1917 which became the Book-of-the-Month Club selection for May. The book jacket referred to "the Frenzied Years of 1914-1917 when. . . a peace-loving democracy, muddled but excited, misinformed and shipped to frenzy, embarked upon its greatest foreign war." This was Millis's approach:[1]

> [The selection traces the steps with which the U.S. abandoned its neutrality: the failure to impose an embargo on the export of arms, the U.S. demand that Germany cease submarine activity against American ships and apologize for past provocation, the close cooperation of English, French and U.S. economies, the breaking of diplomatic ties with Germany, and the heeding of emotional arguments. American neutrality might have brought about an early and generally beneficial peace.]

2. Charles Seymour who as an Assistant Professor of History in Yale College had written on The Diplomatic Background of the War: 1870-1914 in 1916, was selected by Wilson as a delegate to the peace conference in Paris. He returned to Yale and in the 1920's and 1930's wrote and

---

[1]Walter Millis, Road to War: America, 1914-1917 (Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1935), 57-58, 99-101, 180-181, 221, 342, 391-392.

lectured on diplomatic history. These were his conclusions about Wilson's role in the years 1914 to 1917:[2]

> [This essay is a rebuttal to Millis's charge that the U.S. "slithered" into war. Wilson was aware of the effect of his actions and made every attempt to avoid war. For two reasons he had to intervene: the maintenance of American prosperity and the punishment of Germany for submarine attacks. Wilson believed that a negotiated peace could be obtained but at a crucial point the German government decided against this solution. Seymour concludes that war between the U.S. and Germany was finally inevitable.]

3. Charles Warren had been an ambassador to Japan and to Mexico and had served as Assistant Attorney-General of the United States just before we had entered World War I. In the 1930's, as a recognized authority on international law, he advanced the following viewpoint:[3]

> [The article claims that agreements with other nations are necessary for our own protection. Neutral nations have only those rights which the belligerants grant, Warren argues, and the U.S. must accept inconveniences if it intends to remain neutral. In order not to fall into war over the trade rights of neutral nations, we should join in treaties which attempt to prevent the occurrence of war.]

4. This article appeared in the following issue of the same magazine. The author, Allen W. Dulles, one of our delegates at disarmament meetings in Geneva, warned us against thinking we had achieved "a kind of immunity" from war and then recommended this course:[4]

> [The article argues that collaboration is in our self-interest, but the terms of the agreements must not bind us inflexibly to specific actions.]

5. Charles A. Beard had been one of the most vital and most con-

---

[2]Charles Seymour, American Neutrality, 1914-1917: Essays on the Causes of American Intervention in the World War (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1935), 1-9, 11-14, 18-22.

[3]Charles Warren, "Troubles of a Neutral," Foreign Affairs, XII (April, 1934), 377-379, 388-391, 394.

[4]Allen W. Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," Foreign Affairs, XII (July, 1934), 574-575, 577-578.

troversial of all American historians since the publication in 1913 of his book, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. At this time, in a chapter entitled "National Economy as Interest," he developed the thesis that[5]

> [The selection argues that in order to maintain a high standard of living with a firm base of national security, the U.S. government should coordinate its foreign dealings, limit the activity of the armed forces, and discourage U.S. investment and commerce in foreign countries.]

6. Seymour also showed concern with our "choice of alternatives."[6]

> [The selection criticizes isolationism for ignoring inevitable involvement and necessitating sizable armament. It advocates negotiation for the prevention of war, especially in economic dealings.]

---

[5]Charles A. Beard and G. H. E. Smith, The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934), 210, 265-266, 269-270.

[6]Charles Seymour, American Neutrality, 1914-1917, 168, 176-180.

SECTION V

1935: A CLOSER LOOK

Standard in all government texts and in many other books as well is the chart entitled "How a bill becomes a law." We see the bill introduced in the House and then, aided by straight lines and arrows, we follow what seems to be an inexorable course to the Senate and to the President for signature.

No chart can show the infighting which might go on at any stage nor can it hint at the fact that legislation is hammered out in the Congress, sometimes at the prodding of, sometimes with the encouragement of, sometimes over the objections of, the President and others in the executive branch of government.

In this section we will follow the course of the resolutions which eventually became the Neutrality Act of 1935.

There is no chart.

A. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE PRESIDENT

1. Almost all of FDR's annual message to the Congress in January, 1935, was concerned with domestic matters. Near the end, however, he did make these remarks about the international situation:[1]

> [The statement assures the people that despite the hostilities abroad, the peaceful intentions of the U.S. are understood; the threat of war and build-up of arms can be avoided through international agreements.]

2. Early in the year the President encouraged the Senate to consider once again the question of American adherence to the World Court. What

---

[1] The New York Times, January 5, 1935, 2.

hapened is indicated by the following headlines:[2]

> [The headlines, from January 23, to January 30, 1935 reveal that the Senate defeated the President's attempt to gain American adherence to the World Court, despite initial optimism that the vote would be otherwise.]

3. In the middle of March, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, sent this memorandum to the President:[3]

> I. It is Recommended That No Message In Regard to Arms Traffic and Related Matters Be Sent To Congress at This Time
>
> I do not believe that it would be wise to send a Message to Congress at this time on this subject. . . .It is my understanding that the Nye Committee is planning to submit a preliminary report on or about April 1st. A Message by you at this time could easily be misconstrued as an attempt to take the wind out of the sails of that Committee. . . .
>
> II. The Two Principle Methods Which Have Been Suggested For Dealing with The Evils of The International Traffic in Arms
>
> (a) Government Monopoly. The suggestion has been made in various quarters that a Government monopoly of the manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war is the best method of dealing with the evils which have arisen from the present lack of Governmental supervision and control in that field, from various public statements made by Senator Nye, it would appear that this is the solution which he favors. The Committee has not, however, committed itself to this program and there appears to be reason to hope that it may be willing to support a program in accord with the policy of the Administration. . . .In this connection, it may be pointed out that the institution of a Government monopoly would seriously dislocate our whole economic structure, would curtail or put an end to the business of several hundred private companies, and would put this government in business to an extent unknown anywhere else in the world except in the U.S.S.R. It would substitute for our present elastic system, under which arms may be produced in greater or less quantities as occasion may demand, a series of large Government arsenals employing

---

[2]All headlines appeared in The New York Times on the date indicated.

[3]Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1935 (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1953), 318-321.

thousands of men. Under such a system, there would tend to arise a vested interest in continuous manufacture on a scale incommensurate with our needs. Non-producing nations, accustomed to purchase arms in the United States, would be obliged either to purchase from our Government--a procedure which would involve complications unnecessary to elaborate--or make their purchases in other countries, or establish, to the extent of their ability, factories and arsenals of their own. Thus, as far as the effect upon the world at large is concerned, the establishment of a Government monopoly, even by this country acting alone, would probably result in an increase in the total quantity of arms manufactured and perhaps result in an increase in the total quantity of arms manufactures and perhaps in an increased menace to peace.

(b) Supervision and Control Through Licenses and Publicity. Since the negotiation of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, this Government has consistently followed the policy of attempting to establish, by international agreement, a system of supervision and control of the international traffic in arms based upon export and import licenses and full publicity. Under your administration, we have proceeded one step further and have attempted to establish by international agreement a similar system of licenses and publicity for the manufacture of arms. . . .

III. Cooperation With The Nye Committee

I recommend that you take occasion within the next week or ten days to summon the members of the Nye Committee to the White House for a conference. Such a conference would serve several useful purposes.

(1) It would strengthen the hand of our Delegation in Geneva, give support to the policy which we are following in our negotiations there, and help to check any tendency on the part of the Committee to adopt a program of Government monopoly.

(2) It would demonstrate to the public that the Administration is not leaving the active formulation of a program to deal with arms matters entirely to the Committee.

(3) It would demonstrate to the public that the administration is to some degree cooperating with the Committee.

(4) It would enable you to get behind the type of legislation to control the manufacture and of traffic in arms which it is hoped the Committee may be willing to propose.

(5) It would give you an opportunity to advise the Committee to refrain from any unnecessary agitation in public hearings of questions which would handicap this Government in its relations with other Governments.

If you approve of this recommendation, I suggest that you consider to what extent you may feel that it is wise to tell the Committee:

(1) That you have been informed that Mr. Green of the Department of State has, at the Committee's request and with my authorization, presented a draft of legislation to establish some measure of supervision and control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms; that you understand that the Committee now has this legislation under consideration; that this legislation is based upon the same principles as the Draft Articles which are now under discussion in Geneva: that you hope that the Committee may decide to report favorably on legislation of that type; and that if so you are prepared to give the Committee the backing of the Administration in this matter and, if desired, to send an appropriate Message to Congress.

(2) That our Delegation in Geneva is encountering serious difficulty in the negotiation of a Convention dealing with the manufacture of an traffic in arms and that you hope that the Committee may find it possible to include in its report a statement in support of the Draft Convention, in order to help to dispel any idea that the Senate would not give its advice and consent to the ratification of such a Convention if it were negotiated.

(3) That as it may prove impossible to negotiate successfully the more far reaching Convention now under discussion at Geneva, you hope that the Committee may assist in obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate without reservations to the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925.

(4) That the studies which your advisers have been making of the possibility of taking profit out of war have convinced you of the great difficulty of framing satisfactory legislation to that end; that you are looking forward with interest to such recommendations as the Committee may make on that subject; and that you and your associates will be glad to collaborate with the Committee in dealing with this matter to any extent which the Committee may desire.

(5) That the Commission on War Policies is not in any sense working at cross purposes with the Committee.

(6) That you understand that the Committee is planning to investigate the relation of the loans by American bankers to the Allied Governments, before our entry into the War, to our declaration of War, and that you hope that if such an investigation is considered necessary, the Committee avoid in any public hearing the agitation of any question which would offend the governments of the Powers associated with us in the War, thus making it more difficult for this Government to deal with those Governments.

4. A second memorandum, sent on the same day, completed Hull's statement of the State Department's position:[4]

> I. The Prohibition of The Export Trade in Arms and Implements of War
>
> It has been suggested that you propose to Congress legislation
>
> "to prohibit the manufacture in time of peace, by any private interest, of any guns, gas, propellant, explosive, or chemical not commonly used and necessary in the liberal arts of peace"
>
> and
>
> "to prohibit the exportation or sale abroad of any such articles except under a special license to be issued by the State Department in a case in which the Secretary of State shall find that such exportation is required by some duly created international obligation or is advisable under some foreign policy of the United States."
>
> Most of the arguments against the establishment of a Government monopoly in the manufacture of arms and implements of war are equally valid as arguments against this proposal. In addition, it would create an unjustifiable distinction between the manufacturers of some types of implements of war and the manufacturers of other types. Manufacturers of military airplanes, tanks, et cetera, would continue to manufacture their products and export them entirely free from Governmental control. The further proposal that after having secured the suggested legislation, you propose an international convention binding all other nations to adopt a similar program may be discarded as manifestly impracticable in the present state of the world. . . .
>
> II. The Proposal to "Take The Profits Out of War"
>
> This is a difficult thing to accomplish as past experience has demonstrated. It may be doubted whether any means can be found to accomplish it to the extent which proponents of the idea appear to believe possible. Certainly a great deal of further careful study will be necessary before the Administration can formulate any definite program for dealing with such a complicated matter. The proper method of dealing with this matter will probably be found to lie in a carefully worked out

---

[4] Ibid., 322, 323.

law taxing war time profits almost to the point of confiscation. No study on which such a law could be based has as yet been made. I suggest that the question be left in abeyance until the Nye Committee has reported on that phase of its studies and until its findings can be evaluated.

5. What happened when FDR met with the Nye Committee members is detailed in this memorandum[5] from Joseph C. Green, the liaison man between the committee and the State Department, to Hull:

[Washington,] March 20, 1935

In the course of my conversation this morning with Senators Nye and Pope, in regard to the difficulties which have arisen concerning the files of the Guaranty Trust Company, both Senators told me at some length of the conference with the members of the Nye Committee had with the President yesterday. Senator Nye was particularly enthusiastic in regard to the attitude of the President. He told me that all the members of the Committee were present at the conference and that all of them were tremendously pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the work of the Committee with the President, and that they had left the President with the definite impression that he was disposed to cooperate with the Committee.

From the accounts which the Senators gave me of the conference, it would appear that the President in what he said to the Committee departed widely from the suggestions made in the Secretary's memorandum of March 14. They told me that the only questions which were discussed at any length were methods of taking the profit out of war and American neutrality policy in case of a war between other powers. Senator Nye, speaking for the Committee, outlined to the President a scheme for taking profits out of war which had been drawn up for the Committee by Mr. John T. Flynn, and which had met with the general approval of the Committee. The President was stated to have expressed emphatically his approval of the several portions of that scheme. Senator Nye expressed his astonishment at the President's attitude, as he felt that Mr. Flynn's scheme was so radical that the approval of the Administration could hardly have been expected. The President added the suggestion that legislation to take the profits out of war should be drawn up to meet, not only the situation which would arise should we become involved in war, but the situation which would arise should other powers become involved in war while we remained neutral.

They said that the President then discussed our neutrality policy at some length, stating that he had come around entirely to the ideas of Mr. Bryan, in regard to that matter, and that

---

[5] Ibid., 363-364.

he was preparing to propose legislation which would prohibit American ships or American citizens from visiting belligerent countries in time of war. According to the Senators' statements, the President had encouraged the Committee to consider this question of our neutrality policy with a view to the introduction of appropriate legislation. He requested, however, that the Committee give him an opportunity to consult the draft of any legislation dealing with this question before introducing it into the Senate. The Committee readily acceded to the President's request and it was arranged that another conference between the President and the Committee should be held sometime before April 1st, when the Committee expects to make its preliminary report.

The Senators told me that the question of the control of the international arms traffic was referred to only incidentally during the conference.

The Senators told me also that the President did not refer during the conference to the Committee's proposed investigation of the dealings between former allied governments and American banks during the early years of the World War.

6. On April 1, the Nye Committee submitted its preliminary report to the Senate. It asked for more time to carry out many phases of its work, but did make many specific points.[6]

II. The committee is in substantial agreement on a very thorough plan to take the profits out of war and to equalize the economic burden of war, and expects to report on this subject to the Senate legislation on the matter in the immediate future and for action in the present session of Congress. This relates to the actual period of war only. . . .

III. The committee is emphatically convinced that no bill which contains only general authorizations to the President to fix prices or to commandeer industry or to arrange for priorities and licensing is at all adequate "to equalize the burdens and take the profits out of war."

IV. The committee is in substantial agreement on a principle to govern the export of munitions and contraband in case of a major war and expects to make certain recommendations to the Senate on this subject in the immediate future and for action in the present session of Congress. This is the only phase of the neutrality problem which the committee considers to be within its jurisdiction. . . .

---

[6]Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4726-2727.

> VI. At the moment the committee looks with interest and sympathy on the efforts of the American Government to secure agreement on more rigorous international control of the arms traffic and believes that the United States Senate should be glad to consider cordially an international convention based on the general broad outlines of control now known as the "American draft convention."
>
> VII. The committee also expresses its interest in and support of a constitutional amendment to eliminate tax-exempt bonds, because it finds this exemption to be an inevitable and unjustified loophole in respect to the conclusive control of war profits.

7. Early in April, Senators Clark and Nye introduced two resolutions,[7] both of which were referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One prohibited any public or private loan or any extension of credit to a belligerent government or to anyone acting in its behalf. The other stated:

> Resolved, etc., That upon the outbreak of war in any part of the world in which the life and safety of the citizens of the United States may be placed in jeopardy by travel on the high seas the President shall withhold the issuance of passports to citizens of the United States traveling in war zones or traveling on any vessel of any belligerent power except under such regulations as the President may prescribe.

8. Meanwhile, similar actions had been taken in the House. A resolution had been introduced to prohibit loans and the extension of credit to belligerents.[8] A second resolution, introduced by a freshman representative, Maury Maverick of Texas, provided that[9]

> Should war occur anywhere in the world, this Nation shall remain neutral, maintaining an embargo on the export of the munitions of war and on any article or commodity

---

[7] Ibid., 5287.

[8] Ibid., 4719.

[9] Ibid., 5185.

> used in the manufacture of the munitions of war, such embargo to be effective immediately upon the creation of the status of war, and to apply not only to belligerent nations but to those nations likely to reship any such munitions or articles or commodities used in the manufacture of war to any nation engaged in war or being in the status of war. . . .
>
> Should this country ever enter into any war, it shall be only for defensive purposes, and no troops shall be transported to or upon any land which is not the soil of the United States of America.

9. Hull immediately talked with the President and then sent him a memorandum in which he indicated again that there was a "great diversity of opinion among your closest advisers" concerning neutrality. Although he enclosed a draft of proposals the State Department was working on, he was careful to say that he was "not prepared to advocate this or any other specific program for legislation on this subject at this time."[10] Green, after a meeting with the Nye Committee, sent this memorandum to Hull:[11]

> Senator Nye said that he wished that the Committee could wash its hands of the whole question of neutrality legislation; that the Committee had never contemplated dealing with such legislation until "the President laid it on our doorstep." He said that the Committee had plenty to do without attempting to deal with such a complicated matter and that he, for his part, would be glad to turn the whole thing over to the Committee on Foreign Relations. All of the members of the Committee present concurred in this view.
>
> In regard to the question of jurisdiction, the Committee was unanimous in the opinion that the Resolution by which the Committee was created was sufficiently broad to justify it in presenting legislation on the question of neutrality if it so desired. Nevertheless, they felt that, as a matter of

---

[10] *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1935*, I, 331-332.

[11] *Ibid.*, 340.

practical politics, it would be highly undesirable for the Committee to antagonize Senators Pittman [of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] and Borah [of Idaho, ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]. A motion was made and carried unanimously that Senator Nye should be directed to confer with Senators Pittman and Borah, with a view to settling the question of jurisdiction. The hope was expressed that he might be able to persuade them to undertake a discussion of neutrality questions in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and so relieve the Munitions Committee of all responsibility in this field.

10. This was the reaction of one national magazine to the flurry of legislative activity.[12]

[The Nation argues against isolation in favor of international cooperation in order to achieve world peace, the only true guarantee of our peace, to reduce armament, and to provide machinery for negotiating disputes. It supports the Nye Committee in denying the support of the U.S. Navy to our trade in contraband.]

11. And there were other reactions:[13]

[New York Times' headlines on April 13 and April 23, 1935 indicate that students of universities all across the nation are quitting classes in protest "against war and fascism".]

At a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, one of the speakers, attorney Frederic R. Coudert, said: "You can't turn the American eagle into a turtle."

12. Late in April FDR delivered his first "Fireside Chat" of the year.[14]

[The address enumerates legislation in progress: Social Security, work relief, extension of the N.R.A., and regulation of utilities and transportation.]

---

[12]"The Problem of Neutrality," Nation, CXL (April 10, 1935), 404.

[13]The New York Times, April 13, 1935, 1; April 23, 1935, 5.

[14]The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Random House, New York, 1938), 132, 134-135, 138-139.

13. Early in May Senator Clark introduced still another resolution in the Senate.[15] Nye explained the purposes and scope of the resolution in a speech entitled "Profiting from Experience" which he delivered at Carnegie Hall in New York a few weeks later:[16]

> Senate Joint Resolution 120, which Senator Clark and I have proposed and introduced, forbids the export of arms and ammunition to any belligerent country or to anyone acting on behalf of a belligerent in time of war. This provision is mandatory. It recognizes that tremendous pressure will be brought to bear on the President should he seek to curb a profitable trade in war materials after war has broken out. The embargo on arms and ammunition, therefore, becomes effective automatically on the declaration of war by any foreign government. It applies to all arms, ammunition, and implements exculsively designed and intended for land, sea, or aerial warfare. A list of the articles included under this head is appended to section 3 of this resolution. This list is based on the definition proposed by the State Department in the Draft Treaty for the Regulation and Control of the Trade in Arms submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference on November 20, 1934.
>
> The above definition does not cover all war materials. It is virtually impossible, however, to impose a mandatory embargo on all war material because of the practical difficulties of defining articles which have a commercial use as well as a military use in war time. Many commodities, such as fuel oil, nitrates, manganese, cotton linters, and metals of all kinds, are regarded as essential war materials in time of war. In the case of a major war it might be advisable to forbid the export of some of these commodities: in a limited war between two small states such an embargo might not be necessary. Section I, therefore, gives the President some discretion in this matter by authorizing an embargo on any other article or articles which the United States declares to be war material.
>
> Section 3 is simply designed to carry out the purpose of the preceding section. It directs the President, under certain conditions, to publish a list containing the name and description of all articles declared to be war material essential to the conduct of war or armed conflict.

---

[15] Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7042.

[16] Ibid., 8340-8341.

Section 4 recognizes the fact that the United States has not been able to bring about an understanding between the principal maritime powers on freedom of the sear or the definition of contraband. It recognizes, further, that the shipment of contraband may involve the United States in the danger of being forced to defend such shipments at the risk of American lives and with the other economic and social losses involved in the conduct of war. It provides that, in the absence of any treaty or agreement between the principal maritime powers, the President shall proclaim that the export of any article declared to be contraband by any belligerent government shall be solely at the risk of the American shipper or the foreign government or national. . . .

The experience of the last war includes the lesson that neutral rights are not a matter for national protection unless we are prepared to protect them by force. Senator Clark and I, and, I believe, Representative Maverick and other colleagues in Congress believe that the only hope of our staying out of war is through our people recognizing and declaring as a matter of considered and fervently held national policy, that we will not ship munitions to aid combatants and that those of our citizens who ship other materials to belligerent nations must do so at their own risk and without any hope of protection from our Government. If our financiers and industrialists wish to speculate for war profits, let them be warned in advance that they are to be limited to speculation with their own capital and not with the lives of their countrymen and the fabric of their whole nation. . . .

If Morgans and the other bankers must get into another war, let them do it by enlisting in the Foreign Legion. That's always open. . . .

Our American position of security is envious. We of all people should be the last to consider our participation in more war as inevitable. War for us is only so inevitable as we let greed for commercial advantage and profit, while others bleed, remain inevitable. Certainly we should be counting it highly possible to save ourselves, this generation, from more war.

But if it were true that we could not avoid being drawn into that war which might come any moment, we can hardly expect being excused if we fail to exert every honorable effort to make it less easy to be thus drawn, and we ought gladly give of the best that is in us if for no other reason than that we may thus contribute to a greater security against war for those we have brought into this world and for theirs. The least we can do is turn the experience of one generation to the advantage of our own children.

14. Meanwhile, Maverick was holding forth in the House:[17]

> Now, why did we finally enter the World War? It was because we had not maintained neutrality from the first. How are we going to stay out of a war if one starts? The answer is: By maintaining neutrality from the very beginning and by not meddling in affairs that do not concern us. In the last war, we killed ourselves with moral pretense and made money off munitions with which the Europeans killed each other. I propose that in the next war that we drop moral pretense and likewise eliminate moneymaking from the killing of men, whether Americans or just our fellow human beings. . . .
>
> My idea is that before there is any situation similar to the World War--before any hysteria begins to be engendered--we get the law passed at this time, and then, perhaps it will hold down war passions and hatred long enough to avert a war. . . .
>
> I believe that every country on the face of the earth is spending too much on preparation for war; that this money could be better expended upon building up our various nations, and for the propagation of peace. We in this country are spending far too much on the Navy, building worthless battleships. For the price of one of these battleships, as obsolete as a Chinese junk, a thousand planes could be built, but better yet for the same price, 50,000 small farm homes could be built. My hope is, and I think it a safe conclusion, that the peoples of the world will some day realize the waste of great military and naval armaments, as they now realize the horror and futility of actual war, and will stop spending this money and come to their senses. My dream is that the nations of the world will some day, by international cooperation, stop this hideous business of war.
>
> Therefore, we as a nation should establish ourselves as a peaceful people, utterly unwilling to engage in offensive world warfare, and, as I said early in my speech, this will undoubtedly have a good effect upon the world's situation. By an absolute policy of neutrality and impartiality, by abandoning the high note of hypocrisy and faking that we assumed concerning the World War, we can first establish ourselves as a country with honorable intentions and then some day we may develop ourselves toward international cooperation for peace.

15. For the next three months discussions of neutrality legislation centered on the question: Should the imposition of an arms embargo be mandatory and apply to all belligerents or should the President be allowed to discriminate and apply an embargo at his own discretion?

On July 21, FDR agreed to support a discretionary plan. Three days later he held a press conference which was reported in this fashion:[18]

> [The article explains that the President's views are difficult to ascertain.]

16. On August 19, Stephen Early, FDR's press secretary, called Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sounding him out as to the possibility of his introducing a bill which would give the President discretion in the imposition of an embargo. Pittman replied:[19]

> [The selection maintains that the President will "get licked" if he tries to obtain this power.]

B. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND AFTER

1. The following remarks and exchanges, which took place on August 20, indicated the determination of some senators to get down to the business of enacting a neutrality law.[20]

> MR. VANDENBERG. It seems to me perfectly clear, from any critical analysis of our war record from 1914 to 1918, that the absence of a specific neutrality policy which was effective in its proscriptions, absolutely robbed us of any chance to direct our own subsequent destiny. In reality, we were sucked into that war irresistably in spite of anything we could do to prevent the ultimate process. It was the failure to have an affirmative neutrality policy which effectively quarantined us against the results of our own previous pseudo-neutrality, which ultimately created a situation in which we were the victims of our own failure to have the precise kind of a rule which it is now proposed the United States shall announce and announce in time.

---

[18] The New York Times, July 25, 1935, 1.

[19] Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962), 110.

[20] Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 13777, 13779, 13784-13785.

Those who want the United States to be the captain of its own soul must want a neutrality rule written ahead of the necessity to apply it. . . . The time to act is now. . . .

MR. BONE [Washington]. Everyone has come to recognize that the Great War was utter social insanity, and was a crazy war, and we had no business in it at all. Oh, yes; we heard a great deal of talk then about freedom of the seas. Whose seas? The seas upon which were being shipped munitions of war which served only to enrich a comparatively small group of men, and whose enrichment cost this country a staggering price, the enrichment of this group brought down upon our heads the terrible economic problems with which we wrestle right here today and we find it well nigh impossible to solve some of them. Freedom of the seas! Out with such nonsense. For the sake of this fantastic theory that could at best serve the few and not the many, thousands have died, and our hospitals are filled with insane boys who had a right, under God's providence, to live their lives in peace. What a distortion!

MR. CLARK. Mr. President, is it not true, as a mere matter of dollars and cents, to say nothing of the loss of lives and the loss of morale, that for every dollar of profit made by the citizens of the United States out of the munitions business during the war the American people have paid and are paying and will in the future pay a thousand-fold?

MR. BONE. Exactly; and the men whose greed for profit was the occasion of most of it come trooping blithely along and prate of their 100-percent Americanism and their patriotism. There were vast fortunes piled up out of the blood of our boys; and every drop of blood shed on a foreign battlefield was by the alchemy of big business metamorphosed into a dollar that clinked into the cash register of some war profiteer in this country.

Senators, the time has come to put an end to that sort of hell-born business if we wish to preserve the Republic. I do not want my boy to die to further enrich some American millionaire, whose conception of patriotism is the dollar sign and whose conception of proper international relations bears close resemblance to the ethical standards of old Harry Morgan. . . .

MR. TYDINGS [Maryland]. I have no desire to prolong this debate, but I cannot help being a bit philosophical. Many people level criticism at the President and the administration, and at the Members of the Senate and the House who sat here and declared war in 1917. They imply that the Congress acted wrongly. But none of us can calculate what would have happened if the Congress had been so paralyzed by fear that it would not have declared war. Who can tell what the consequences of silence would have been in that time, whether or not there

might not have been another map of the world made, whether these United States of America would be the country for which the Senator's forefathers fought and died?

It is always easy to criticize what someone has done, but it is very much harder to do better, and particularly when we have only the one consequence physically before us on which to base our judgments. Therefore, hating war as I do, and sympathizing with the philosophy which the Senator from Washington is expressing, I think that sometimes it is easier on humanity to fight than not to fight. I submit that for whatever it is worth. . . .

MR. CLARK. I wish to occupy the time of the Senate for just one moment to suggest that the philosophy expressed by my friend the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Tydings] is precisely the philosophy, precisely the complacent regard for war as inevitable, which has actually made war inevitable since time immemorial.

In further reference to what the Senator from Maryland said, it is not the purpose of the proponents of these joint resolutions, it is not the intention of the advocates of the establishment of a definite neutrality policy, in any way to reflect upon the President of the United States or those who made up his administration, or the Congress which voted for war.

We simply recite the facts of the last war in which we were engaged to establish the proposition that it was the lack of a definite neutrality policy established by law, which would automatically go into effect upon the declaration of war, which made war inevitable, and which tied the hands of President Wilson and the members of his administration and the Members of the Congress who finally inevitably voted for war. We seek to avoid a situation whereby the Senator from Maryland, the Senator from Washington, and other Members of this body and the body at the other end of the Capitol, may be forced into a similar impasse.

MR. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I rise only to take particular and special and personal exception to the remarks of the Senator from Missouri insofar as he passes upon my mental processes, commenting that the philosophy I was expressing made war inevitable. I may say to the Senator that since the World War we have had a League of Nations, a World Court, and we have had the Kellogg-Briand peace pact, and I do not know how many Locarnos, and many other pacts, and those connected with such conferences have all been working to avert war; yet it looks as though we are again on the brink of war.

I desire to point out to the Senator that my philosophy is utterly different from his.

MR. CLARK. I am glad it is.

MR. TYDINGS. The Senator assumes that the way to end war is to pass some resolutions here in the Senate. Within the past 2 months on this floor, in an address of over 2 hours, I expounded in full my philosophy as to how to prevent war; which, boiled down, is this: Not the path of fear, but the path of courage. Not the path of an inferior nation, but the path of a superior nation. Not the path of isolation, but the path of cooperation.

The Senator knows that tariff trade embargoes carried to an extreme, the depreciation of the money system, such international questions as the failure to settle the war debts, and inability to agree upon a method to bring about disarmament, are a thousand times more responsible for the conditions existing between Ethiopia and Italy and all the other countries in Europe than any particular philosophy embraced in these joint resolutions.

I do not propose to have the Senator say that I want war or that I like war; but I think I have as much intelligence as the Senator from Missouri has, and I ought to be permitted to approach the peace question from a different angle than he does without any aspersions being cast upon my mental processes.

2. After the debate had been going on about three hours, Pittman arrived with a bill which his committee had approved and which was essentially the same as the final legislation. The Senate, on the next day, approved the bill with almost no discussion. In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee, after heated debate, reported the bill with the proviso that the arms embargo provision be valid for only six months. When the bill was considered on the floor of the House, extended debate ensued. The following selections indicate the opposing points of view.[21]

MR. MAVERICK. This Senate amendment provides an embargo on arms. That is not anywhere near enough, but it is something.

---

[21] Ibid., 14357, 14358.

2

But I submit, Mr. Speaker, there are three features that concern this resolution which should be in any future legislation we should pass.

First, we should not delegate the power to the President of the United States. [Applause.] When I say we should not delegate this power to the President of the United States, I am looking at the President as an institution and not as an individual, because I certainly would say that if Mr. Hoover were President, I would not want a lot of power delegated to him. Therefore, it should not be delegated to any human being. If the President is delegated optional powers to declare embargoes, why is he, in effect, given the power to declare war? We should never surrender such a power to the Chief Executive.

I want Congress to enact definite legislation and not to delegate and abandon to any Chief Executive the duty to keep our country out of war. Let us do our own duty.

The second point is that the policy of neutrality in this country, the policy of staying out of war, should not be up to the 29th of February, but it should be permanent. We should have a permanent policy of staying out of war. This resolution only provides until the 29th of February. I am willing to agree to that, though reluctantly, because we will be back here in Washington by that time and will have a lot of experience by that time, but when we come together again this should be made permanent. All I can say is that the resolution before us is not complete. It does not go into contracts and loans, which is very important. It does not go into many, many other features, but I am willing to vote for it as the best we can get.

Now, my third point is that when we return we should then go into this fully and enact far-reaching comprehensive, clear-cut legislation, and not be afraid of crusty advisers of the State Department or noisy admirals. We know that by precedent nothing has been done to stop war, so let us break some precedents, and next year let us not wait until the last minute and vote for some more imcomplete legislation. Let us all resolve to study the question in the meantime and come back in January and do our duty promptly. . . .

MR. WADSWORTH [New York]. I appreciate perfectly well the ideals which move the good people who support this measure. I respect those ideals myself, but at the same time it seems to me that we would better be fairly realistic when we begin to

legislate about what America shall do with respect to its conduct in the future when trouble breaks out in the world. Let us be realistic and see if we can apply the provisions of this proposed measure to circumstances that may arise. Without intending to express any sentiment for or against any foreign nation, let me suggest that today there exists a situation which some people regard as threatening the peace of the world but which affects primarily and in the first instance only two nations, Italy and Ethiopia.

Italy is a great, powerful nation, equipped with industrial facilities and resources. Ethiopia is a small nation, utterly lacking in industrial resources. The philosophy of this legislation suggests that the weak nation shall not be permitted to purchase arms with which to defend itself. This brings up a very important vista that causes me to doubt very much indeed whether we should legislate mandatorily upon a question of this sort. No two wars are alike in their inception. No two wars bring about exactly similar consequent conditions. I am therefore wondering if it is wise for America, which, after all, is the hope of the peace of the world, to freeze its policy of neutrality in a statute. Is it safe? Is it wise?

The purpose of this legislation is to this effect: When two or more nations fall out and go to war, neither of them or any of them may purchase supplies from the outside; for surely if this purpose is sound, then it should become the law of the nations. It occurs to me that such a situation presents an open invitation to the great and the powerful to attack the weak, knowing that the weak is forbidden by the law of the nations, including the law of the United States, to purchase a weapon with which to defend itself.

3. Only Senators Johnson and Connally had much to say on the final day of deliberation.[22]

MR. JOHNSON [California]. The only reason or perhaps the best reason, why this joint resolution should be passed is that finally the United States of America by it states a policy, the policy of minding our own business, keeping out of Europe, European controversies, foreign wars, and the like.

After 17 years of suffering in that regard, after reading a press throughout this country during that long period which was at variance with the views I have expressed, it is delightful now finally to find justification of the men, very few, who stood firmly years ago and through all the long period since have stood firmly for maintaining America in America's security and in America's pristine glory and keeping out of every foreign entanglement and every European war.

---

[22] Ibid., 14430, 14432.

So today, when we are about to pass what is miscalled a "neutrality" resolution, and when we are about to pass something of which we have little knowledge, because at the end of the session and because of the little time we have had to devote to it, in one thing we may glory, my friends, for one thing we may be thankful. The joint resolution makes plain the policy of the United States of America to keep out of European controversies, European wars, and European difficulties. So today is the triumph of the so-called "isolationists", and today marks the down-fall, although we may not know it, of the internationalist who has been devoting his gigantic energy in the last 17 years to involving us in machinations abroad and who would take us into Europe's troubles and into Europe's difficulties and foreign organizations dealing with foreign controversies. . . .

Pass this joint resolution if you desire. There is no great harm in it. Pass it, reserving unto the Congress of the United States the right to determine the important questions, and continuing to reserve that right. Pass it if you will, in order that it may state something of a policy. But, sir, in passing it, do not be under the delusion that war is going to be prevented or that the millennium has come because of it.

We must pass it now, in advance of the war, it is said. Not so at all. We would do infinitely a better job if we should wait until the occasion arose and the realities were before us. But in acting upon the joint resolution let us act upon it with no idea that we have solved the great problem that is here. Let everyone of us, so far as we can, make plain to our people, not that we have stopped all future wars, not that this measure is going to prevent any future conflict, but let them know that it is a makeshift, at best, and that, after all, it amounts merely to a declaration of American policy, of keeping out of Europe and Europe's controversies, Europe's wars, and remaining just American.

MR. CONNALLY [Texas]. Mr. President, I shall not vote against the pending joint resolution, I shall support it; but I do so because it is temporary, and because it is at least a gesture in the interest and in behalf of peace. I do not believe the Committee on Foreign Relations or the Senate itself has had sufficient time for deliberation and proper consideration of the joint resolution.

Mr. President, I pray God that we may never have another war in which the United States will be involved. I do not believe that this joint resolution in and of itself will make any substantial contribution toward a realization of that hope. For myself, I think it unwise to announce the policy

stated in section 1 of the joint resolution. It is a straight announcement by statutory law that the United States, in the event of war anywhere on this earth, will sell neither supplies nor ammunition to any nation, regardless of the issues involved, and regardless of all other considerations.

Under international law it is not an unneutral act for any nation to sell arms and ammunition and supplies to any nation at war. That is not an unneutral act. By this measure, in section 1, we are judging in advance every international clash or conflict which may occur anywhere on earth.

My own view is that section 1 of the joint resolution should provide that the President of the United States, who is charged under the Constitution with the conduct of our foreign relations, should have the power, in the event of a conflict, in his wisdom to place an embargo upon the shipment from this country of arms and ammunition and supplies. Then the United States would not entirely abdicate all of its international influence.

Is it an expression of neutrality to say to two warring nations, one of which has ambitions for territorial conquest, the other unprepared, the other weak, the other trying to pursue its own destiny - is it neutral to say to those nations, "We shall give arms to neither of you," thereby insuring the triumph of the prepared nation, the covetous nation, the ambitious nation, the nation which seeks by force of arms to impose its will on a weaker and defenseless nation?

Mr. President, that is not neutrality; that is a form of unneutrality. That is a form of declaration which announces that the United States will take the side of the strong and the powerful against the weak, the unprepared, and the defenseless. Why not leave that determination to the President of the United States when and if, in his conduct of our foreign relations, it becomes a sound American policy for him to take a position in a crisis of that kind?

Mr. President, Congress alone can declare war. Resting here in this body and in the other Chamber of the Congress is the power to declare war, and it rests nowhere else. We cannot become involved in a war until the Congress plunges the people into the war. Can we judge of it in advance? We cannot. We cannot now put the United States into an international straitjacket and thereby keep out of war. We cannot by an act of Congress put the United States into a concrete cast internationally which will fit all future occasions and solve all future problems. . . .

It is the President's function to conduct our international affairs. The history of the world demonstrates that never, in all the long years of strife and struggle,

has a parliamentary conduct of international affairs been successful.

It must be vested in the Executive until the Congress steps in and makes a declaration of war.

4. On August 28th, FDR told reporters:[23]

[The President states that the neutrality bill is appropriate to the present situation; it will be changed by the time the situation changes.]

5. On the same day, the President wrote a letter to Norman Hapgood in Petersham, Massachusetts:[24]

[The letter reveals the President's approval of the present form of the neutrality bill since it leaves him considerable discretionary power.]

6. On August 29, Hull sent this final memo to the President.[25]

Section 1 would require the President "upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between or among two or more foreign states" to "proclaim such fact". Thereafter it would be unlawful to export such arms as the President might designate to any of the belligerent states. This provision is, in my opinion, an invasion of the constitutional and traditional power of the Executive by legislative act a fixed and inflexible line of conduct which it must follow, thereby depriving it of a large measure of its discretion in negotiating with foreign powers in circumstances when Executive discretion and flexibility of policy might be essential to the interests of the United States. Furthermore this provision would tend to deprive this Government of a great measure of its influence in promoting and preserving peace.

---

[23]Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, 116.

[24]Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash, eds., F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1950), I, 504.

[25]Foreign Relations of the United States: 1935, I, 350-352.

The question of our attitude toward collective action against an aggressor is only one of the many aspects of a much larger question.

Section 2 contains provisions, selected apparently somewhat at random and without due consideration of the importance of the parts which are omitted, drawn from S. 2998, a Bill which in its original form was a carefully considered and well coordinated unit. . . .

In spite of my very strong and, I believe, well founded objections to this Joint Resolution, I do not feel that I can properly in all the circumstances recommend that you withhold your approval. Section 1 terminated on February 29, 1936. Section 2 is so manifestly inadequate that it will have to be later amended. I hope that satisfactory legislation to replace these two sections can be enacted at the next session of Congress. I shall at the appropriate time venture to submit, for your consideration, the text of a message on this subject which you may wish to address to the Congress.

If you intend to make a statement to the press in regard to this Joint Resolution you may wish to make some such statement as the following:

I have given my approval to S. J. Res. 173--the neutrality legislation which passed Congress last week.

I have approved this Joint Resolution because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war. This Joint Resolution may in some degree serve to that end. Section 1 terminates on February 29, 1936. There will be time before that date for Congress to give further and fuller consideration to the subjects dealt with in this Joint Resolution. I hope that Section 1 may be replaced by permanent legislation which will provide for greater flexibility of action in the many unforeseeable situations with which we may be confronted. It is the policy of this Government to avoid being drawn into wars between other nations, but it is equally our policy to exert the influence of this country in cooperation with other governments to maintain and promote peace. It is conceivable that situations may arise in which inflexible provisions of law might have exactly the opposite effect from that which was intended. I hope also that Section 2 may be redrafted along the lines of the Bill to control the trade in arms, ammunition and implements of war, which was favorably reported by the appropriate Committees of both Houses but which failed of enactment. Moreover, when this subject is again considered by Congress, it may well be found that the Joint Resolution may be expanded so as to include provisions dealing with

important aspects of our neutrality policy which have not been dealt with in this temporary measure.

If, for any reason, you should not deem it advisable to make such a statement, would you or not suggest my giving a similar statement to the press?

7. Two days leter FDR signed the bill. As he did so, he remarked:[26]

[The statement praises the flexibility of this bill which regulates the arming of American vessels, the use of American waters by foreign submarines, the travel of citizens and the embargo of arms to belligerents. The President suggests extension of the act to other areas of our neutrality policy.]

8. History records the following chronology:

October, 1935	Mussolini invades Ethiopia.
July, 1936	Civil War breaks out in Spain.
January, 1937	Another neutrality law retains the prohibitions on munitions and loans, makes travel on belligerent ships illegal, and provides that belligerents buying non-military goods must pay for them in cash and take them away in their own ships.
July, 1937	Fighting breaks out between China and Japan near Peiping.
October, 1937	FDR delivers his "quarantine" speech in Chicago.
January, 1938	FDR asks for a billion-dollar naval appropriation.
September, 1938	Hitler gains the Sudetenland as a result of the Munich Conference.
March, 1939	Hitler takes over Czechoslovakia; Franco takes over in Spain.
August, 1939	Germany and Russia sign a non-aggression pact.
September, 1939	Hitler invades Poland; World War II begins.

9. On the afternoon of September 21, 1939, Franklin Roosevelt addressed a joint session of the Congress and asked for a repeal of the arms embargo. Near the beginning of the speech he referred to the "so-called" Neutrality

---

[26]The New York Times, September 1, 1935, 1.

Act of 1935 and said:[27]

> I regret that the Congress passed that act. I regret equally that I signed that act.

---

[27] *Congressional Record*, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 10.

SECTION VI

THE USES OF HISTORY: LAST THOUGHTS

We come again to the question: What, after all, are the uses of history? Perhaps by now you have some thoughts on the subject. The selections in this section are intended to keep you thinking.

1. Early in June, 1966, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., spoke at the 30th annual commencement exercises of the New School for Social Research in New York. He warned that the "Vietnam riddle. . . could not be solved by historical analysis" and then continued:[1]

> [The selection warns against thinking that one can find rules for behavior in situations seemingly analogous to the present.]

2. The following article was written by Eugene J. McCarthy, United States Senator from Minnesota:[2]

> [The article criticizes our large export of arms as contributing to world tensions and aggressions.]

---

[1] The New York Times, June 8, 1966, 34.

[2] Eugene J. McCarthy, "The U.S.: Supplier of Weapons to the World," Saturday Review, July 9, 1966, 13-15.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING

The most recent general account of foreign policy in the period is Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965). Adler's earlier work on The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (Abelard-Schuman Limited, New York, 1957) is still valuable, however, especially in its treatment of developments of the 1920's. Valuable also, but requiring careful reading, is Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953). Somewhat easier going is Louis J. Halle, Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958).

As for individuals involved in the history of this era, the best one-volume biography of FDR is James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1956) while the most recent and thorough account of Senator Nye's career is to be found in Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962).

Two books mentioned occasionally in the unit are deserving of a second mention: Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962) and John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36 (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1963).

The background of the concept of neutrality is conveniently summarized in the early chapters of Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962).

Students might also profit by selecting any of the magazines mentioned in the unit and thumbing through, almost at random, any of the issues for the years 1934 and 1935.